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Empowerment or Imposition?  




Introduction: Bosnia and the Paradox of Peacebuilding 
The term ‘local ownership’ has become increasingly central to the vocabulary of 
post-conflict peacebuilding.  Emphasized by both theorists and practitioners, local 
ownership conveys the commonsense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by 
those who have to live with it is likely to fail.  Indeed, students of peacebuilding often 
point to the divergence of international and local priorities as a factor in the decidedly 
uneven record of peacebuilding over the past decade.  While the basic premise of 
peacebuilding, as Necla Tschirgi has suggested, is that peace cannot be imposed by 
external forces, military or otherwise, but must rather be nurtured through patient, 
flexible strategies carefully calibrated to the domestic political context, the empirical 
record suggests that peacebuilding in practice more closely resembles an externally-
driven exercise in both state-building and social engineering.1  Local ownership, in other 
words, is accepted in theory but rarely practiced. 
Post-Dayton Bosnia provides a textbook example of this gap between theory and 
practice.  Wolfgang Petritsch, the international community’s High Representative in 
Bosnia from 1999-2002, played an important role in promoting the idea that if peace was 
to take hold in Bosnia, Bosnians in general – and their elected officials in particular – had 
to be front and centre in the peace process.  Petritsch’s call for local ownership, however, 
ran directly counter to the interventionist nature of his administration.  Armed with the 
so-called ‘Bonn Powers’, given to the High Representative in 1997 by an international 
community exasperated by the slow pace of peace implementation, Petritsch imposed 
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literally dozens of pieces of legislation – on such crucial matters of state as the state flag, 
a new currency, and the creation of a state border service.  He similarly dismissed dozens 
of local officials (including one member of Bosnia’s tripartite state presidency), many of 
whom were elevated to office in elections organized by the international community.   
Petritsch’s term as High Representative, in fact, inaugurated what has been 
termed a period of ‘protectorate democracy’ in Bosnia, in which the international 
community promotes democratic governance and local ownership while simultaneously 
reserving for itself most key decision-making authority.2  Reflecting on the record of 
Petritsch’s successor, Lord Paddy Ashdown, Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin likened the 
role of the High Representative to a European Raj:  
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, outsiders do more than participate in shaping the 
political agenda – something that has become the norm throughout Eastern 
Europe, as governments aspire to join the European Union.  In BiH, outsiders 
actually set that agenda, impose it, and punish with sanctions those who refuse to 
implement it.3 
 
While the notion of protectorate democracy is rife with contradictions, in Bosnia’s 
case, at least, there is an increasingly strong case to be made that the country has turned a 
corner in recent years, and that this is largely because of, rather than despite, the 
assertiveness of the international presence.  While only a few years ago Bosnia remained 
in a curious limbo between war and peace, today the champions of ethnic apartheid are 
on the defensive, competent state-level institutions are gradually taking root, and the idea 
of EU membership has for the first time become a genuine aspiration rather than a distant 
illusion.  While the international community has made more than its share of mistakes in 
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Bosnia, from the perspective of early 2007 it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
much of the recent progress is the result not of local ownership, but of international 
pressure and perseverance.   
While Bosnia’s recent experience may yet prove to be an anomaly in 
peacebuilding’s overall balance-sheet, it does suggest that overly simplistic prescriptions 
for local ownership miss important elements of the peacebuilding dynamic.  Rather than 
advocating a full swing of the pendulum from protectorate democracy to full local 
ownership, what may be needed is a more nuanced understanding of how international 
and domestic political forces interact in post-conflict situations, and what relationship 
between the two is most likely to be conducive to the goal of sustainable peace. The 
objective of this paper, then, is to unpack the notion of local ownership, and to explore 
the tensions between external imposition and local ownership in peacebuilding processes.  
It will argue that because the notion of local ownership has rarely moved beyond the 
level of rhetoric, little serious thought has been devoted to the question of how to manage 
the inevitable tensions between external imposition and local ownership that lie at the 
very heart of contemporary peacebuilding processes.   
The paper unfolds as follows: the next section will explore understandings of 
‘local ownership’ in contemporary peacebuilding situations.  It will suggest reasons why 
local ownership questions aren’t taken more seriously in post-conflict contexts, as well as 
reasons why they should be.  After an examination of both domestic and international 
obstacles to greater local ownership, the paper subsequently considers the challenges of 
‘operationalizing’ local ownership, and the difficulty of reconciling international norms 
with local cultural, political, and social realities.  The paper concludes with an attempt to 
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re-frame the discussion of local ownership by acknowledging that ‘local owners’ are both 
part of the problem and part of the solution in post-conflict contexts.  Given this, external 
actors invariably become part of complex and highly politicized post-war governance 
arrangements; the key question, it will be suggested, is not whether this is inherently right 
or wrong, but whether outsiders use their authority wisely and in the interests of war-
affected populations. 
 
Meanings of, and obstacles to, local ownership in peacebuilding processes 
Coming to terms with questions of local ownership in peacebuilding processes 
requires, first and foremost, an acknowledgement of at least two competing visions of 
peacebuilding.  The first, closely associated with eminent conflict resolution practitioners 
such as John-Paul Lederach and Adam Curle, emphasizes what has come to be known as 
‘peacebuilding from below’.  As Ken Bush has summarized this perspective, “the 
challenge of rebuilding wartorn societies is to nurture and create the political, economic 
and social space within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and employ the 
resources necessary to build a peaceful, just, and prosperous society.”4  The alternative, 
top-down perspective sees peacebuilding as an effort “to bring war-shattered states into 
conformity with the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic 
governance.”5  According to this perspective, peacebuilding is about transforming war-
shattered polities into functioning liberal democracies, with the liberal democratic 
framework seen here not only as the gold standard of good governance, but also as the 
most secure foundation for sustainable peace. 
The debate between these two visions of peacebuilding mirrors the broader 
communitarian/cosmopolitan debate within normative international relations theory.  
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Peacebuilding communitarians hold that the right of societies to make their own way (and 
their own mistakes) in the world should take precedence, regardless of the degree to 
which the choices of individual societies correspond with emerging international norms 
(which are often viewed from this perspective as being less universal than Western).      
Peacebuilding cosmopolitans, conversely, insist that global norms surrounding principles 
of good governance do exist and should carry weight.  Self-determination in the context 
of post-conflict peacebuilding, accordingly, is not an unlimited field of possibility, but 
rather a right balanced by responsibilities to respect and uphold international norms, 
particularly concerning human rights, democratic governance, and market-oriented 
economic arrangements.  Global political circumstances in the aftermath of 9/11, and the 
heightened awareness of the dangers that failed, unstable, or war-torn states pose to other 
states in the international system, have bolstered the arguments of those who insist that 
responsible membership in international society requires domestic politics to be 
organized in a particular manner. 
The concept of local ownership is the nexus at which these two perspectives 
intersect.  Peacebuilding situations, in other words, represent a concrete manifestation of 
the erosion of the inside-outside divide that has long been a fundamental organizing 
principle of international relations.  In post-war contexts, both outsiders and insiders 
claim legitimate political authority, and in the absence of effective mechanisms of 
accountability it is often an open question which of these sets of actors better represent 
the ‘best interests’ of post-conflict societies.  Ultimately, then, peacebuilding situations 
raise hard questions about the meanings and limits of state (as distinct from national) self-
determination in the aftermath of violent conflict or state failure, about the rights, 
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responsibilities and legitimate expectations of the outside actors who intervene in such 
situations, and about the character of sovereignty in states emerging from war.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, on questions of local ownership the broader international 
community has leaned towards the cosmopolitan viewpoint.  From the perspective of 
most peacebuilding operations, local ownership has been much more about the 
responsibilities of good governance than it is about the freedom to choose among 
alternate socio-political and economic organizing principles.  Here again, the Petritsch 
conception of local ownership in post-Dayton Bosnia is instructive.  In Petritsch’s public 
statements on the issue, the concept of ownership was always closely married to the idea 
of responsibility.  The implication, as Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac have 
pointed out, is that local ownership is not about autonomy, but rather about domestic 
political structures taking responsibility for implementing a pre-existing (and externally-
defined) set of policy prescriptions. In other words, “while responsibility for politics is to 
be placed back on the shoulders of local people, this is a disciplined politics, regulated by 
international norms.”6  Far from restoring autonomy to local societies, this can be viewed 
as a fundamentally disempowering form of local ownership, with internal political forces 
expected both to uncritically adopt and to actively implement an external blueprint for 
post-conflict transformation. 
As peacebuilding has evolved and become increasingly institutionalized in the 
post-cold war era, several key factors have combined to push peacebuilding practice in a 
cosmopolitan direction.  The first of these is the extent to which ‘liberal internationalism’ 
has emerged as the contemporary commonsense of peacebuilding.  As Roland Paris has 
argued, the wisdom of “transplanting Western models of social, political and economic 
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organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict” continues to be 
taken as self-evident by most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding, even 
though the liberal internationalist paradigm doesn’t have a particularly impressive track 
record in post-war settings.7  Nevertheless, the absence of credible, coherent alternatives 
leaves the basic tenets of liberal internationalism unchallenged, to the extent that 
peacebuilding often comes to resemble a technocratic exercise in installing the basic 
pillars of the liberal democratic state.  Given these assumptions, it is little wonder that the 
work of peacebuilding is often seen as best suited to Western technocratic experts, who 
are familiar with the mechanics of liberal democratic institutions if not the particular 
socio-political contexts of the societies in which they are working.  As Keith Krause and 
Oliver Jutersonke have recently suggested, most outside peacebuilding interventions 
“follow a donor-driven, bureaucratic-institutional logic that conjures into existence a 
social field on which policies can be imposed by experts defined not by their local 
knowledge but by their grasp of institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of 
society and social change.”8  In this technocratic version of peacebuilding, local 
perspectives are more often viewed as hurdles to be overcome or obstacles to be avoided 
than as potential sources of sustainable solutions.  Coupled with the economic tenets of 
what Stephen Gill has termed ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, characterized by an equally 
de-politicized, technocratic vision of economic reform backed by World Bank and IMF 
conditionality,9 the liberal internationalist vision leaves little room for dissent, local or 
otherwise, regarding the basic parameters of peacebuilding. 
A second obstacle to more serious consideration of local ownership is what 
Hughes and Pupavac term the ‘pathologisation’ of post-conflict societies.10  Failed and 
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war-torn states, according to mainstream discourse, are framed alternately as ill, 
traumatized, dysfunctional, irrational, or immature, thereby legitimizing a shift towards 
‘therapeutic governance’, whereby the international community takes over responsibility 
for a polity no longer capable of managing its own affairs.  A discourse of 
pathologisation that characterizes post-conflict societies as comprised of hapless victims 
and psychotic victimizers enables paternalistic attitudes and disciplinary interventions on 
the part of outside peacebuilders.  As locals are likely to be viewed by outsiders with 
either pity or suspicion, the implications for questions of local ownership are clear.  
Where permitted at all, local ownership unfolds under the careful supervision of 
responsible outsiders, who set the broad parameters of what is and is not permissible.  As 
Paris has noted, there are clear echoes here of the colonial-era ‘mission civilisatrice.’11  In 
the modern-day version, the powerful states of the international system feel a moral 
obligation to export the civilizing and pacifying effects of their political and economic 
institutions to the distinctly ‘uncivil’ terrain of post-conflict states.  Locals are typically 
relegated to the role of grateful recipient in this process, and deviation from this script 
simply reinforces outsider perceptions that the locals lack the maturity to exercise real 
political authority. 
Dismissive and distrustful outsider perceptions towards local actors become more 
comprehensible, if not necessarily more defensible, when examining actual or potential 
‘agents’ of local ownership.  Local political elites – whether democratically elected or 
otherwise – represent the most obvious, and usually the most problematic, set of local 
owners.  Particularly in the context of armed conflict, many elites will have risen to 
positions of authority through sheer ruthlessness, and this reality raises troubling 
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questions of both legitimacy and representativeness once a semblance of post-war 
‘normalcy’ returns.  Similarly, since wartime and post-war elites are almost inevitably 
one and the same, only the sunniest of optimists would expect that those who bear 
primary responsibility for the conflict in the first place would rush to embrace a peace 
process requiring compromise and conciliation with former enemies.  Equally troubling is 
the light that the emerging literature on the political economy of conflict has cast on the 
economic motivations behind contemporary conflict.  This literature suggests that the 
criminalization of local political elites is a common feature of modern conflict, with such 
elites at least as likely to see the post-conflict period as an opportunity to consolidate 
war-time economic gains as an opportunity to work towards reconciliation and 
sustainable peace.12  Ultimately, then, conflict situations rarely produce enlightened, 
progressive political leadership. The war-induced collapse of the rule of law is, in fact, 
much more likely to vault the corrupt, the extreme, and the ruthless to power, thereby 
justifying at least some outsider caution when contemplating the value of post-war 
domestic elites as peace partners. 
Ultimately, therefore, while local political elites are in the best position to stake 
an ownership claim in any emerging peace process, they can rarely be counted on to 
unproblematically commit themselves to the goal of building an inclusive, democratic, 
and prosperous post-war society.  Elections represent the standard solution to this post-
war dilemma of political representation, with the goal being to generate legitimate, 
representative, democratically-elected, and moderate political elites who can 
subsequently take on a greater ownership role over the peacebuilding process.  Elections 
have also been utilized by the international community as a filtering mechanism to 
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exclude those – such as the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic – deemed unsuitable 
for participation in post-war electoral politics.  The evidence, however, suggests that 
post-war elections rarely produce the conciliatory, pro-reform governments hoped for by 
those who organize them.13  More commonly, elections reproduce the very socio-political 
cleavages that peacebuilding hopes to overcome, and accord democratic legitimacy to the 
very same wartime elites whose commitment to peacebuilding may be dubious at best.     
A third and final impediment to giving local ownership a more central role in 
peacebuilding is a more practical one, relating to different aspects of the peacebuilding 
timeframe.  First, peace processes, because of their often fragile nature, tend to be heavily 
path-dependent, with key elements of the post-war settlement locked in at the time of the 
signing of a peace accord.  While this is perhaps the most crucial stage of any peace 
process, during which the broad outlines of post-conflict political and economic 
arrangements are set, this is also the stage least conducive to effective local input.  
Participation of local elites in peace negotiations is by definition highly factionalized and 
militarized, civil society – if it retains any coherence as a result of the wartime experience 
– is invariably shut out of formal peace negotiations, and the institutional vacuum typical 
of most societies beginning the transition from war to peace places severe constraints on 
the capacity of a domestic bureaucracy to contribute to the establishment of post-war 
ground rules or to the harmonization of international norms with domestic political 
realities.  In most cases, then, by the time local political forces and institutions have a 
chance to re-organize themselves, the basic parameters of the post-war settlement have 
already been established, and may prove extremely difficult to re-orient. 
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Timeframe considerations also impinge on the opposite end of the peacebuilding 
continuum, particularly vis-à-vis the ongoing preoccupation with international ‘exit 
strategies’.  To be fair, the international community has long acknowledged that 
successful post-war elections rarely represent the appropriate moment for international 
withdrawal.  Yet while it is increasingly accepted that peacebuilding necessarily involves 
a longer-term commitment on the part of international interveners, this commitment is 
rarely open-ended.  This reality, combined with the relatively short-term, project-based 
cultures of most donor organizations, generates considerable pressure for the rapid 
achievement of concrete and measurable results, which is why success is often measured 
in terms of rehabilitated infrastructure or returned refugees, regardless of broader 
questions of sustainability or of the political dynamics underlying these developments.  
One difficulty of engaging seriously with questions of local ownership as an integral part 
of the peacebuilding endeavour is that such strategies rarely produce immediately 
measurable results, are by definition less easily controlled by outsiders, and – like any 
democratic process – tend to be messy, time-consuming, and inherently unpredictable.   
Outsider concerns in this area emerge most clearly with regard to engagement 
with domestic civil society, usually seen as an alternate, and ideally more progressive, set 
of candidates capable of wearing the ‘local ownership’ mantle.  Because of the typically 
turbulent and conflictual relationship between the international community and local 
political elites in peacebuilding contexts, considerable attention has been devoted in 
recent years to the idea of supporting post-conflict civil society as a counterbalance to 
those holding formal political power.  More consistent with the notion of peacebuilding 
from below, the idea is to empower local non-governmental actors who are generally 
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viewed as being more unproblematically committed to post-conflict peacebuilding.  As 
Beatrice Pouligny has put it, civil society is “often seen to carry the best hopes for a 
genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic exploiters, and 
warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-ridden, weak, or failed states, and may even 
capture the electoral processes.”14  By and large, however, the record of post-conflict 
civil society building has been disappointing.  External donors have generally 
underestimated the challenges of reconstructing civil societies in war-shattered states, 
while over-estimating the influence of civil society organizations as peace constituencies.  
Donor dependency has emerged as a major issue, with local NGOs less a manifestation of 
local ownership than an additional channel through which international influence can be 
exercised.  At the same time, the standard view of civil society as a universal force for 
good is often dashed by the politicized realities of post-conflict situations, in which civil 
society organizations might be subject to the same sets of political dynamics, constraints, 
and incentives that affect local political elites.  In other words, empowered and activist 
civil society organizations may not necessarily be pro-peace, but might just as easily 
engage in the type of factionalized politics that stand in the way of sustainable 
peacebuilding.  As John Prendergast and Emily Plumb have suggested, while civil society 
organizations can make a positive contribution to peacebuilding, they can also “reinforce 
negative, conflict-producing elements of the economic and social structure of a given 
state, particularly one consumed by a war economy.”15 
Given the inherent risks and inevitable complexity involved in operationalizing 
the concept of local ownership in a more meaningful and participatory manner, why 
bother even trying?  The short answer is that local ownership can be deferred, but cannot 
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ultimately be avoided.  In the absence of perpetual international trusteeship, the logical 
end point of any peace process is the handover of sovereign responsibility back to local 
authorities;16 the more these authorities can claim both authorship and ownership over the 
peace process, the smoother and more successful the transition is likely to be. 
At the same time, the argument that in order to be sustainable, post-conflict 
settlements must be firmly rooted in domestic social realities remains compelling.  
Insiders have to live with the outcomes of peace processes in ways that outsiders do not, 
and externally-imposed arrangements – particularly if they are seen as reflecting the 
vested interests of foreigners – are unlikely to thrive once the influence of external 
pressure and resources begin to recede.  Indeed, the questionable durability of the 
externally-driven policy reform is a key lesson learned from a half-century of 
international development assistance.  As the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has noted, 
“experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment 
and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms.”17  In the area of post-conflict 
peacebuilding, this sentiment is echoed by Charles Call and William Stanley, who 
contend that “no amount of training or institutional development will produce positive 
results where domestic actors are not really interested in changing the status quo.”18 
Ultimately, then, the case for substantive local ownership rests on the argument 
that the challenge of re-constituting state institutions, re-establishing social contracts 
between state and society, and re-building social relations in the aftermath of war is 
simply too immense to achieve in the face of either inertia or outright opposition on the 
part of those being reformed.  In fact, one of the important lessons of the past decade of 
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peacebuilding practice relates not to the excesses of international power and authority in 
Bosnia and elsewhere, but rather to the limits of international influence or, as Mark 
Baskin has phrased it, “the gap between unlimited formal international authority and 
limited international operational capacity.”19  In other words, while locals may be viewed 
by outsiders as junior partners in the peacebuilding enterprise, domestic power structures 
retain considerable capacity to block, circumvent, and/or undermine the most carefully-
designed policy reforms.   Equally importantly, in much the same way that genuine 
reconciliation cannot be imposed by outsiders, no amount of externally-generated policy 
prescriptions can shift post-conflict societies from a culture of violence to a culture of 
peace.  There is no avoiding the reality, therefore, that for all the pretensions of the 
international community, if peacebuilding is to succeed much of the heavy lifting must be 
done by war-affected communities themselves. 
More positively, there is also an argument to be made that locals remain, to a 
large extent, an underexploited peacebuilding resource.  The conflict resolution 
community has long argued that local wisdom and local resources are essential elements 
of peacebuilding; insiders possess the historical, cultural, and linguistic resources that 
outsiders lack, and that are essential not only to understanding the root causes of any 
conflict but also to the search for sustainable solutions.  Drawing more heavily on local 
expertise and knowledge need not necessarily entail abandoning the conventional liberal 
democratic peacebuilding paradigm, but rather implies a more serious commitment to 
reconciling international standards with local conditions than has been demonstrated to 
date.  As Simon Chesterman et al have argued, “the international policy community has 
been singularly hesitant to explore the connection between differences in institutional 
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arrangements and local variables with a view to maximizing the prospects of liberal 
democracy and market economy taking root and flourishing.”20  
If local ownership is to mean more in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding 
than local authorities following international dictates, the current international 
preoccupation with peacebuilding outcomes must be tempered by greater attention to 
peacebuilding processes.  In other words, the goal of peacebuilding should not be simply 
to erect the central institutional pillars of a liberal democratic state as rapidly as possible 
in the aftermath of conflict, but rather to ensure that these pillars rest upon solid 
foundations, are adjusted to local conditions, and develop not only through a genuine and 
collaborative partnership with war-affected communities, but also in ways that are 
supportive of the broader goals of sustainable peace.     
 
Operationalizing Local Ownership 
Assuming that indigenous actors seek to build a post-war society in conformity 
with international norms of domestic governance, there need be no inherent contradiction 
between communitarian and cosmopolitan understandings of peacebuilding.  The role of 
outsiders, in this sense, is simply to support local actors – whether through security 
provision, technical expertise, or material resources – in their efforts to re-orient their 
societies and their institutions along a standard liberal-democratic trajectory.  The 
political contexts of post-conflict societies, however, are rarely so simple.  In the same 
way that the phrase ‘post-conflict’ more often than not obscures an ongoing reality of 
profound political divisions within societies emerging from war, the notion of ‘local 
ownership’ also tends to assume a coherence and commonality of purpose among 
domestic political forces that is rarely present in post-conflict contexts, and to gloss over 
 16 
the social complexity inherent in any social order.  In reality, then, not only do the 
interests of local political actors rarely align with those of international actors, they 
almost never align internally around a coherent roadmap to peace.   
Ultimately, then, peacebuilding is inevitably a highly politicized process of not 
only mediating between outside and inside visions of ‘governance’, but of forging 
domestic consensus around fundamental political issues.  While abstract notions of local 
ownership enjoy near-universal acceptance in principle, such notions offer little concrete 
guidance in terms of determining whose voices should be prioritized among the 
cacophony of real and potential ‘local owners’ or in terms of how to address situations in 
which the priorities of significant local actors run counter to either the interests of the 
broader post-conflict society or to fundamental international norms.  In post-war 
Afghanistan, for example, where the range of local owners runs the gamut from President 
Karzai to emerging women’s groups in civil society to the warlords linked to the 
country’s thriving drug trade (many of whom now hold elected office), both the 
complexities of operationalizing local ownership and the risks of taking the concept too 
far are obvious.  As Dan Smith has suggested, “a failure to recognize the reality of the 
conflict context might make a simple commitment to local ownership almost fatal to the 
hopes of successful peacebuilding.”21  If the operationalization of local ownership 
principles was entirely unproblematic, in other words, there would be no need for 
external intervention in the first place.  
Examining local ownership questions through the lens of post-conflict ‘capacity 
building’ offers one pathway into the complex issues involved in attempting to 
operationalize local ownership in ways that simultaneously place greater decision-making 
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authority in the hands of domestic actors while advancing the broader goals of 
sustainable peace.  In important ways, capacity building – whether it involves the re-
constitution of state-level institutions (peacebuilding as state-building) or enabling the 
work of domestic civil society organizations – is the core activity of contemporary 
peacebuilding.  Clearly, the notion of peacebuilding as capacity-building is closely linked 
to the cosmopolitan conception of peacebuilding outlined above, and suggests a process 
of outsider-led social engineering aimed at generating the institutional framework of 
liberal democracy.  In this context, local ownership is viewed more as an end than a 
means, with decision-making authority gradually transferred by back to local actors as 
the appropriate institutional infrastructure becomes operational.   
As many observers of peacebuilding practice have pointed out, this vision of 
peacebuilding involves a serious power imbalance between outsiders and insiders.22  
Outsiders control all the resources, they frame the decision-making structure concerning 
what types of capacity are to be constructed, where, and how, and they enjoy 
considerable flexibility in choosing among local implementing partners.  As David 
Moore has noted, the depth of the power imbalance between outsiders and insiders in 
post-conflict situations, combined with the reality that post-war societies are inevitably in 
flux between ‘old’ and ‘new’ systems, has led some international actors to view post-
conflict environments as blank slates upon which a new social, economic, and political 
order can be written.23  Yet while the temptation of international actors to press their 
advantage in post-conflict situations without properly considering domestic socio-
political factors or properly consulting domestic counterparts may be strong, it is also 
fraught with danger.  Most obviously, peacebuilding processes which unfold without a 
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minimum level of domestic ‘buy-in’ risk alienating local populations and local power-
holders, who may turn against capacity-building projects which are seen to be 
insufficiently tailored to local needs or to challenge existing domestic power structures. 
Yet capacity-building initiatives also reveal deeper dilemmas which lie at the 
heart of what Jane Chanaa has termed ‘the imposition-ownership divide’,24 dilemmas 
which are perhaps most evident in the area of security sector reform.  From Iraq to 
Afghanistan to Haiti, one of the most critical peacebuilding challenges involves 
reconstituting and re-orienting domestic security forces (the police and the military most 
prominently) in order to re-establish domestic capacity for security provision.  While the 
technical tasks of recruiting, vetting, and training new security forces are onerous 
enough, more difficult still has been the twin challenge of ‘socializing’ new recruits (or 
re-socializing old ones) to adopt Western (or ‘foreign’) conceptions of what it means to 
be a soldier or a police officer and of generating loyalty to newly-minted state 
institutions.  Thus, the as-yet-unmet challenges of ensuring that newly-trained Iraqi 
soldiers don’t cut and run at the first sign of confrontation and of weeding out corruption 
within the Haitian National Police reveals a serious gap between the ability of outside 
peacebuilders to establish new institutions and their ability to make these institutions both 
effective and legitimate.  This dynamic points to the dangers of creating ‘rootless’ 
institutions that are not embedded in the political culture of the post-war state, and to the 
somewhat naïve assumptions of outsiders that the socialization process required to embed 
external norms on issues such as community policing can be accomplished with a few 
weeks of basic training coupled with ongoing ‘mentoring’ by outside professionals.  The 
reality is that the capacity-building rhetoric of peacebuilding, and its assumptions about 
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the creation of new institutional structures that are either indifferent to, or deliberately 
distinct from, domestic political culture, obscures the necessity of a broader process of 
norms-transmission that has proven exceedingly difficult to achieve within conventional 
peacebuilding timeframes. 
Faced with such challenges, external actors are often faced with the unpalatable 
choice between retreating back to the more technical, achievable tasks of capacity 
building (focusing on numbers of individuals trained, vetted, etc.) or moving to a deeper 
level of engagement that combines capacity-building with what might be termed 
‘capacity disabling’.  In other words, in many cases the nature of post-conflict 
peacebuilding is such that effective capacity building requires, as a prerequisite, parallel 
efforts to disable, marginalize, or co-opt those domestic political power structures which 
stand in the way of the effective establishment of new institutions (since new institutions 
threaten the power bases of those who enjoy privileged positions in ‘old’ institutions) and 
which may command considerable loyalty among significant sectors of the population.  
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this problem can be seen in Afghanistan, where 
the creation of the new Afghan National Army has been complicated by the significant 
influence of warlord militias and the unwillingness of international security forces to 
confront them.25  Similarly, the 12-year-old effort to establish an effective Haitian 
National Police has been continually compromised by the politicizing and corrupting 
influences of domestic political forces, from Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s Lavalas movement 
to the increasingly influential networks controlling Haiti’s drug trade.     
Such issues, more generally, pose hard questions about the role of domestic 
authority structures (whether traditional or conflict-generated) in peacebuilding 
 20 
processes, and effective peacebuilding requires equally difficult decisions about whether 
such structures should be empowered or dismantled.  Those engaging in capacity 
building initiatives must decide, for example, whether authority structures based on 
clientelism represent a vital source of social capital or an obstacle to the establishment of 
modern political institutions.  As Prendergast and Plumb have suggested in the context of 
outsider support to civil society organizations, “in the efforts of international agencies to 
build local capacity and enhance participation, questions need to be constantly asked 
about whether traditional authority structures are being undermined and – given their 
repressive nature in some places and their role in preserving the social fabric on other 
places – whether they should be.”26   
Yet if outside peacebuilders must, in some form and at some level, confront pre-
existing power structures in order to create the political space in which new power 
structures can emerge, there are also real risks involved in attempting to sideline existing 
power structures seen as standing in the way of effective peacebuilding.  As alluded to 
above, one of the major influences of outsiders in peacebuilding processes lies in their 
ability to ‘pick winners’ in the process of selecting appropriate local peacebuilding 
partners.  Rather than simply fading away, however, the ‘losers’ in such processes may in 
fact re-emerge as dangerous spoilers.  As Jens Narten has suggested, “one standard 
operating procedure of sidelined elites is to generate their income and general power 
basis from illegal sources by engaging in the black market or organized crime and by 
seeking political influence through corruption or means of intimidation.”27  This 
conclusion reinforces the earlier point about the limits of international influence, as even 
the most aggressive forms of outside intervention may fail to fundamentally alter the 
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underlying dynamics of post-conflict societies.  At the same time, however, the failure to 
address these underlying dynamics may compromise the broader peacebuilding process, 
and it is precisely this concern that pulls international actors further into the domestic 
politics of post-conflict societies, and further away from communitarian notions of 
peacebuilding. 
Given the simultaneous imperatives of post-conflict capacity-building and 
capacity-disabling, then, it is hardly surprising that the search for more substantive forms 
of local ownership is, more often than not, deferred.  For even a conception of 
peacebuilding based on ‘creating space’ for local actors to find their own ways towards 
sustainable peace may require intrusive and lengthy efforts to address (or push aside) 
post-war political structures that effectively deny the social, political and economic 
‘space’ required for bottom-up peacebuilding.  Rather than abandoning the prioritization 
of local ownership until such issues are resolved, however, there remains a pressing need 
to think through how local ownership considerations can be integrated as a resource in 
the crucial struggle for post-conflict political space.   
Writing in a recent issue of Security Dialogue, Rolf Schwarz proposes the 
formula of ‘local ownership coupled with international standards’ as one way of trying 
reconcile local ownership questions with broader imperatives of sustainable 
peacebuilding.28  While Schwarz’s discussion of this issue is underspecified, it does 
suggest that the debate between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism need not be 
framed in either/or terms.  In other words, it should be possible to maintain a normative 
commitment to the principle tenets of liberal internationalism while still holding that a 
meaningful degree of local ownership is essential to the success of any peace process.29  
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The ‘local ownership coupled with international standards’ formula implies, in fact, that 
reconciling international norms with domestic political culture and domestic political 
realities should be a basic priority for external peacebuilders.  The experience of the loya 
jirga in Afghanistan represents but one example of the creative merging of international 
principles with local structures, with considerable positive consequences in terms of both 
legitimacy and effectiveness.   
At the same time, however, the Schwarz formula may exaggerate the extent to 
which a middle ground can be found between international norms and domestic realities.  
While the middle ground that does exist should clearly be exploited, there are also cases, 
as noted above, where domestic cultural and political practices – from deeply-rooted 
clientelism and corruption to cultural norms around the treatment of women – run 
directly counter to the norms being promoted by external peacebuilders.  In such cases, 
there is no avoiding the culture clash between outsider and insider, or the reality that in 
some cases trade-offs must be made between making peace and promoting good 
governance (does, for example, the prospect of negotiating with the Taliban represent a 
sell-out of Afghans – especially Afghan women – or simply a pragmatic necessity in 
order to avoid an open-ended insurgency?).  That such dilemmas must be negotiated on 
an almost daily basis within peacebuilding contexts underscores that for outsiders, 
peacebuilding always involves strategic processes of side-taking and ally-making in order 
to minimize the dissonance between external norms and internal political realities.  It also 
underscores the need to make hard choices about which domestic practices cannot be 
allowed to remain in place if sustainable peace is to take hold, and which may simply be 
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impossible to alter given the scope, mandate, or timeframe of any peacebuilding 
operation.    
Ultimately, while there can be no how-to manual for managing the tensions 
between external imposition and local ownership in peacebuilding contexts, the 
preceding discussion does point to the importance of paying greater attention to the 
imposition-ownership divide, and of moving beyond empty rhetorical commitments to 
local ownership.  The post-cold war record of peacebuilding, and the oft-cited statistic 
that upwards of half of all peace processes collapse within the first five years, suggests 
not only that outsiders still have much to learn about effective peacebuilding, but also 
that there are serious weaknesses within the standard liberal internationalist approach to 
post-war transitions.  There is, as Elizabeth Cousens has suggested, considerable 
justification for outsiders to be ‘ruthlessly modest’ about what they can and cannot 
accomplish within the inevitably complex and politically-volatile contexts of any 
peacebuilding operation, and for re-considering the merits of applying 
technical/institutional solutions to what are deeply-rooted political problems.30 
The plea for humility also implies a recognition of the limits of externally-led 
social engineering; not only can sustainable peace not be achieved without the buy-in of a 
critical mass of the war-affected society, but there are also real limits to the speed and the 
extent to which local actors can be ‘socialized’ to accept international norms surrounding 
good governance.  Even assuming that such a socialization process is desirable, it usually 
cannot be achieved within the timeframe of the average peacebuilding mission.  
Ultimately, therefore, outsiders can neither ignore insiders nor re-create them in their own 
image.  Rather than a viewing peacebuilding as ‘accelerated modernization’, in which the 
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old, dysfunctional, conflict-prone order is replaced by a superior Western order 
underpinned by shiny new liberal democratic institutions, peacebuilding is perhaps better 
understood in terms of cultural exchange, with the over-arching goal being to merge 
elements of old and new, inside and outside, in order to create a more just, stable political 
order. 
Re-visioning peacebuilding in terms of cultural exchange would require 
adjustments to the current technocratic model of post-conflict peacebuilding.  As Beatrice 
Pouligny has suggested, such a shift would require outside interveners to re-define 
themselves as facilitators rather than directors, but also a more concerted effort on the 
part of outsiders to understand the cultural context of the societies in which they operate.  
An acceptance that local actors are indeed central to the success of any peace process, 
Pouligny suggests, “implies [the need for] fundamental changes in the intelligence and 
communication capacity of outsiders, in order that they might better understand local 
contexts and, more particularly, identify the local actors likely to be the major motors for 
change.”31  While the suggestion that outsiders pay more attention to the social and 
cultural dynamics of societies they wish to transform isn’t especially radical, it is perhaps 
an important first step both in recognizing that outsiders don’t have a monopoly on either 
expertise or solutions, and in placing questions of local ownership closer to the centre of 
the peacebuilding problematique, where they rightfully belong. 
 
Conclusion 
Questions of local ownership are both unavoidable and fundamental in post-
conflict peacebuilding processes.  While it may not necessarily be the case that 
substantive local ownership is a prerequisite to successful peacebuilding, it may well be 
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the case that peacebuilding can succeed under ‘foreign ownership’ only in cases, such as 
in post-Dayton Bosnia, in which the international community is willing to invest 
enormous resources and considerable time.  In most contemporary peacebuilding 
situations, however, this type of international commitment is unlikely to be forthcoming.  
Yet if it is true that local ownership matters to successful peacebuilding, the debate 
around local ownership, its manifestations, and its consequences has been surprisingly 
shallow to date, and has rarely progressed beyond the largely rhetorical acceptance of the 
basic idea.  Conversely, when local ownership questions emerge more prominently in 
international discourse – as in post-Taliban Afghanistan – there are usually good reasons 
to suspect that it has more to do with the unwillingness of international actors to engage 
fully with the peacebuilding challenge than with a serious commitment to local 
ownership principles. 
The Afghan case, in fact, underlines the dangers of viewing local ownership 
questions in simplistic binary terms.  As the foregoing discussion has tried to 
demonstrate, local ownership should be viewed not as an either/or question, but rather as 
a delicate, complex, and often shifting balancing act, in which the division of 
responsibilities between outsider and insider is constantly calibrated and adjusted as a 
means to advancing the peace process.  Too much local ownership, in most peacebuilding 
contexts, may be as dangerous to the prospects for peace as too little local ownership, and 
may reflect little more than an abdication of responsibility on the part of external actors.   
Indeed, while the motivations underlying the behaviour of internal actors are often 
(and rightly) questioned in peacebuilding contexts, there are also dangers in accepting 
external interveners as unerringly benevolent and unfailingly committed to seeing peace 
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processes through to their just, sustainable conclusion.  Especially given the power 
imbalances between insiders and outsiders inherent in any post-conflict process and the 
widely-acknowledged absence of accountability among international actors, while one 
can hope that external actors approach questions of local owners in the context of the 
‘best interests’ of the peace process, it should perhaps not always be expected.  As 
Tschirgi has recently noted, for example, there is a real danger that the character of 
international interventions in the post-9/11 world is not only moving further away from 
serious consideration of local ownership issues, but also away from the interests of 
sustainable peacebuilding in favour of protecting the security interests of the intervening 
actors.32  In exploring questions of local ownership, therefore, and the division of 
authority between international and domestic actors, serious questions need to be asked, 
and answered, about the motives and intentions of insiders and outsiders alike. 
This paper has argued in support of a new peacebuilding partnership that makes a 
serious and sustained effort at bridging the international-local divide in the name of 
sustainable peacebuilding.  Such a partnership should self-evidently not be based on 
naïve assumptions about ‘locals knowing best,’ since such assumptions are surely as 
dangerous as the currently dominant assumption that internationals know best.  Rather, 
moving towards a new partnership between locals and internationals in peacebuilding 
situations must be based on the realistic conclusion that peacebuilding can only succeed 
with the sustained contributions (and buy-in) of both internationals and locals.  Finding 
ways to combine local and international resources in ways that maximize the long-term 
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